

COMPETITION FOR RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND ISLAMIST SUCCESS IN INDONESIA¹

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Abstract

This article seeks to explain variations in the success of Islamist mobilization. It argues that Islamist groups do better where competition for religious authority is intense. These religious “markets” are conducive to Islamist success because they 1) lower the barriers of entry to new religious entrepreneurs, 2) incentivize established leaders to support Islamist mobilization, and 3) push moderate leaders into silence. The article develops this theory by examining sub-regional variations in Islamist mobilization on the Indonesian island of Java. Using newly collected data on Java’s 15,000 Islamic schools, it compares religious institutions across more than 100 regencies in Java. In addition, it uses dozens of field interviews with Indonesian Islamists and Muslim leaders to show where market structures have facilitated the growth of Islamist groups.

Keywords: Political Islam; Islamist Mobilization; Radicalism; Moderation; Indonesia

Introduction

As Islamist groups expand into new regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, understanding what accounts for their success is more important than ever. As both Muslim and Western governments increasingly seek the help of so-called “moderate” Muslim leaders, we still know little about why some of them are better able to mitigate the growth of militant Islamist groups. The landscape of contemporary Islamism is exceptionally diverse. Some

communities seem more vulnerable to Islamist mobilization than others, while some Muslim leaders seem to have a louder and more credible voice when contesting Islamist doctrines. What explains these variations?

This article adopts a micropolitical perspective on the question of Islamist success. It argues that the rise of Islamist groups depends on the configuration of the religious “market” in which they seek to operate. A religious market is a social arena in which old and new religious entrepreneurs and organizations compete for followers and religious authority. I argue that Islamist groups fare better when established Muslim leaders are weak and when competition for religious authority is intense. These religious markets are conducive to Islamist success because 1) they lower the barriers of entry to new religious entrepreneurs, 2) incentivize established leaders to support Islamist mobilization, and 3) push moderate leaders into silence.

I develop this theory of Islamist success by examining religious mobilization on the Indonesian island of Java. Since the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed the rise of small but vocal Islamist groups. Unlike similar groups elsewhere, militant groups in Indonesia do not seek to capture state authority through a revolution or a coup. Instead, they have used violence or the threat of violence to protest against what they conceive as immorality, misguided religious minorities, and blasphemy. In the last twenty years, these groups have leveraged their social and religious popularity into political influence. They have pushed local administrations to ban or constrain the activities of some minority groups and to adopt various sharia-inspired regulations that undermine social and political freedoms.

These groups have experienced more success in some regions than others, however. The province of West Java, for instance, accounts for nearly 60 percent of all Islamist protests in Java since 1998. The contrast with East Java is striking, a region that has experienced only about 10

percent of the protests. What accounts for the clustering of protests in some regions? Using newly collected data that compares religious institutions across Java, I show how local religious markets explain the success and failure of Islamist groups in some regions of Indonesia.

Quantitative and qualitative evidence illustrates that local institutions played a key role in the rise of Islamist groups in Indonesia. I complement these results with field interviews with Indonesian Islamists, civil society actors, and Muslim leaders on how institutional incentives have facilitated the rise of Islamist groups in the most fragmented and competitive religious markets of Java.

This article is structured in three parts. After reviewing approaches in the study of Islamist mobilization, I lay out a micropolitical theory of Islamist success. Second, I discuss the rise of Islamist groups in post-transition Indonesia and highlight the puzzling yet unexplained regional variations in their success. Third, I present cross-regional data on the configuration of religious markets in Java. Finally, I explain how these markets led to different mobilizational outcomes by focusing on two provinces of Java: the violent prone West Java and the more peaceful East Java. I discuss the broader implications of these findings for the literature on Islamism and moderation in the conclusion.

Religious Markets and Islamist Success

Why do Islamists succeed and sometimes fail? This article focuses on militant groups that mobilize above ground to transform the prevailing political and social order into one based on Islamic laws and institutions. Islamist “success” is defined here as the ability to grow a base of followers and conduct collective action, violent or not.

Several studies have linked Islamist success to a “demand,” which is often rooted in grievances or social insecurity. Many have argued that social, economic, and political strains or crises produce psychological distress and discontent that make Islamist ideologies more appealing and mobilization more likely.² Others view Islamist success as a response to the uncertainty and anxiety generated by processes such as rapid urbanization, modernization, and globalization.³ Here, religious violence reflects not the strength of religious identities, but their perceived fragility and vulnerability.⁴ Although grievances and anxiety undoubtedly matter, comparable socio-economic conditions have not triggered Islamist success everywhere, while similar feelings of deprivation and anxiety have produced different forms or levels of mobilization.

Others, in response, bracket out demand and frame Islamist success as a question of resource mobilization and political opportunities. They see private mosques, welfare societies, and cultural organizations as key building blocks of Islamist success because they provide the infrastructure to organize collective action, generate funding, and build networks of cadres and supporters across localities.⁵ The delivery of public goods, in the absence of state provision, is also said to help Islamists win the hearts and minds of new recruits and the broader population.⁶ Organizational resources are rarely enough, however. Islamist success is often linked to political opportunities, such as state failure, democratization, or the lifting of state repression. These opportunities delimit not only Islamists’ viability, but also their choices of tactics and actions, such as whether they radicalize or moderate.⁷ While useful, this approach tends to focus primarily on national, macro-structural opportunities. If it explains timing, it generally leaves unexplained the reasons why these groups arise in the places where they do.⁸ This is surprising

given a parallel body of work examining local institutions and processes of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and genocides.⁹

To account for subnational variation, we need a better understanding of the local institutional environment where militant groups are able to take roots. Islamist groups do not operate in a vacuum but face a crowded terrain of established Muslim clerics, intellectuals, networks, and institutions. Islamists, just like other Muslim leaders, are religious entrepreneurs who compete for “sacred authority.” This struggle for the right to speak in the name of Islam is, I argue, inherently relational: Islamists’ success is contingent on the position and strength of other players in the religious environment and on their response to Islamists. The literature identifies “strategic interactions” as a driver of violent radicalization, but focuses mostly on interactions among militant groups and between militant groups and the state.¹⁰ It thus offers limited insights about the choices and strategies of those who are not part of an Islamist movement, such as most Muslim clerics and organizations, and on how they either facilitate or jeopardize Islamist success.

The notion of “religious market” provides a powerful tool to theorize this environment. The religious economy literature, its leading advocate, highlights the supply-side dimension of religious activities by focusing on the “firms” that produce religious “goods” and their interaction in a religious market of current and potential customers.¹¹ It argues that the structure of the religious market—either competitive or monopolistic—shapes the behaviour of religious leaders and firms. Open religious markets are deemed to generate greater competition for survival, forcing religious firms to be more dynamic and responsive to needs of their constituency. Small firms or new entrants are also thought to be more entrepreneurial than firms

with greater security of tenure, extensive assets, or large followings. This approach to religion has generated valuable insights about the political behavior of religious organizations.¹²

While useful, the religious economy's most significant shortcoming is its commitment to economic rationality. It has repeatedly claimed, for example, that religious competition induces moderation because it forces every religious firm to gravitate toward the moderate center where most customers reside.¹³ This conception of competition assumes stable preferences and utility maximization. In religious matters, however, "value" cannot be assessed from a neutral standpoint, but always ascribed and contested by the actors themselves.¹⁴ The notion of religious market does not at all require economistic assumptions.¹⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, who comes from a different theoretical tradition, also conceives religious behavior as taking place within a field of production, exchange, and competition. But, for him, religious leaders are more than salespeople creating value for customers.¹⁶ While they compete for followers, they more fundamentally struggle for religious authority, i.e., the power to define the legitimacy of competing forms of religious expression.¹⁷ In this power struggle, competition may not always lead to moderation, as religious entrepreneurs can mobilize a rich and flexible set of symbolic and discursive resources to legitimize their rule, including violence-enabling ones.¹⁸

In this article, I borrow the notion of "religious market," while adopting a political approach to religious identity and competition. I conceptualize a religious "market" as a space, an arena, where religious entrepreneurs and organizations interact, cooperate, and compete for religious authority. The notion of market is useful to capture religious dynamics in the decentralized structure of Sunni Islam.¹⁹ In the absence of a Church, Muslim clerics must behave like entrepreneurs to attract followers and resources, both crucial to their organizational survival and claim to religious authority.²⁰ It is a "market," however, because Muslim clerics cannot

coerce assent or participation, but must convince their followers who remain free to change mosque, listen to another preacher, or send their children to another madrasah.²¹

I contend that a religious market's structure is a key yet overlooked factor in the success or failure of Islamist groups. First, I argue that the structure of a given market provides more or less space to new Islamist groups. In competitive markets, Islamists face fewer barriers to entry. They do better because they do not have to displace influential leaders or organizations that already dominate the religious market. Islamists can also build their base of followers and organize protests more easily when conventional Islamic networks are porous or lack institutionalization, as they can fill up the gaps or the "structural holes" as new brokers.²² In such markets, Islamists compete on an equal footing with other leaders and find it easier to convince people of their credibility and authority.

Second, I argue that markets also shape how established actors respond to Islamist groups. Islamists' success and outreach can be significantly amplified if they win the support of local elites, such as politicians, business people, or other religious entrepreneurs.²³ In other words, they are more likely to succeed when they can embed themselves into pre-existing social or economic networks.²⁴ Among all potential allies, religious leaders—such as established preachers, imams, or ulama—are crucial because they are opinion leaders on salient religious and political issues.²⁵ Established religious leaders are well-positioned to grant or deprive Islamists of legitimacy as well as promote or contest Islamist doctrines.²⁶

A competitive religious market has two consequences for how established religious leaders respond to Islamist groups. First, competition creates incentives for weak and marginal clerics to support or join Islamist groups as a way to bolster their status and position.²⁷ Competition makes the long-term survival of most entrepreneurs uncertain and precarious,

particularly those with a weaker and more marginal position in the market. Marginal clerics must be exceptionally entrepreneurial if they want to survive. They have to “up their game” to get attention, which makes them particularly inclined to use strategies of outbidding, provocation, and scapegoating.²⁸ As extensively observed in ethnic politics, for example, these strategies are powerful as they show one’s commitment, make the status quo unacceptable and reorder people’s sense of priority, discredit leaders with an ambiguous position, and help gain visibility and exposure.²⁹ Islamist leaders compete particularly well in these environments because they offer an identity, a rich repertoire of actions and concepts, as well as networks and resources to entrepreneurial clerics. In brief, Islamist groups are more successful where established clerics are weak and religious markets more crowded and competitive. Conversely, less competitive environments create fewer incentives for Islamist support. Established leaders can afford to be more passive when they have a secure position, with more followers and resources.

Competition also increases the cost of moderate, anti-Islamist mobilization. There is a fundamental imbalance between the cost of holding a radical discourse and those of holding a moderate or pluralist one. Anti-Islamist or moderate clerics face a dilemma: if they mobilize against Islamists, they possibly risk becoming the targets of outbidding or scapegoating rhetoric, being called out as apostates, and being seen as traitors to Muslims among their followers.³⁰ Moderate mobilization is thus risky for clerics who do not have a strong enough position in a religious market. Anti-Islamist leaders are less likely to mobilize against Islamists if they are weak and operate in a competitive environment. In such a context, few leaders feel that they can “waste” their (limited) religious capital on the Islamists question and most prefer to adopt a more prudent approach. From the outside, it appears as if there are few or no moderates, while in actuality, the moderates are simply too weak to respond to the Islamists. This context helps the

Islamists to capture the tone and content of the public discourse. By contrast, anti-Islamist leaders find it easier to mobilize against Islamists when they have more followers, occupy a more central position in their market, and thus enjoy more legitimacy. This helps mitigate the risk and cushion the cost of anti-Islamist mobilization. Moderate mobilization in the public space is thus less a question of the strength of one's pluralist ideas, but more a question of the strength of one's institutional and structural position.

Comparing Religious Markets and Measuring Religious Competition

Religious authority is elusive, and competition is hard to measure. Few studies have tried to systematically assess and compare religious elite structures within a country, much less tried to link these elite structures to political outcomes. Most of those who have examined competition have focused on Christian societies and have used denominational strength or growth as a measure of competition.³¹ In Islam, however, competition “is not played out between organized units competing for support in the manner of denominations, but between talented mediators competing for patronage by anticipating the likes, needs, and preferences of audiences.”³² The unit of analysis must be the individual cleric, but it is harder to measure each cleric's relative success in a market. There is no survey of clerics, most of them do not keep a tally of their followers, mosques do not have attendance sheets, and there are many outlets where preaching and proselytization may occur.

This article proposes a new and original way to measure Islamic authority and market structure by focusing primarily on Islamic schools (known as *pesantren* in Indonesia), an

institution similar to *madrasahs* elsewhere in the Muslim world. Indonesia's approximately 29,000 *pesantren* educate and socialize many young Muslims. More importantly, Islamic schools provide a source of religious authority for their leader, the ulama (or the *kyai* as they are known in Indonesia). The larger is an Islamic school, the more influential is its leader since he has a larger flock, more alumni, and more extensive networks.

I compiled original data on Islamic schools to compare and contrast religious markets across regions in Java.³³ I treated Islamic schools as the “firms” and their students as the “market shares.” To gauge market structure, I relied on data produced by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Ministry publishes yearly almanacs that survey Indonesia's religious schools and report basic information such as the owner's name, the number of students, and the location of the school. I coded almanacs back to 2002 to measure cross-regional variation and temporal changes to religious markets across Java.

While not a perfect measure of religious authority, this proxy offers a useful snapshot of how religious authority is structured, experienced, and practiced in Java. For Java alone, I collected information about more than 15,000 religious schools and some 30,000 religious leaders in over a hundred districts. This unique data allows me to measure cross-regional differences in religious market structures in a systematic way. I also conducted extensive fieldwork in Java in 2015, where I interviewed Muslim clerics and leaders of Islamist groups to get a more fine-grained understanding of how market incentives shape their behavior.

One limitation of these data is that they do not include information about “clerics without pesantren” (*kyai tanpa pesantren*), but does include limited information about informal public preaching (called *majelis taklim* in Indonesia) that are not linked to an Islamic school. Moreover, social media and television preachers are a growing trend in Indonesia as elsewhere, and it is

impossible to garner systematic data on these preachers and their flocks. Fortunately, patterns observed in the pesantren market are largely similar to those observed in the informal public preaching ones. This strengthens my confidence that pesantren and their students capture an essential and structuring dimension of religious markets in Indonesia.

Islamist Mobilization in Indonesia

Following the democratic transition of 1998, hundreds of small Islamist groups emerged throughout Indonesia. While they do not form a single unified movement, most pursue similar goals through extra-institutional mobilization: they reject secular democracy and pluralism and advocate for the inclusion of Islamic principles and laws in the Indonesian constitution.³⁴ In the early 2000s, these groups focused on “cleaning up” the streets of cities such as Jakarta, Surakarta, and Makassar from “sinful” activities. Invoking the Quranic edict of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (leading people toward good and away from evil), they raided nightclubs, brothels, and gambling dens. These groups were initially seen as nothing more than thugs in Muslim garb, and their operation as protection rackets.³⁵

In the mid-2000s, Islamist groups expanded their agenda and started targeting religious minorities. They spread to smaller cities and rural towns around 2008 and started to gain widespread traction. Since then, they have repeatedly attacked, sealed, or destroyed mosques of “deviant” Muslim sects and “illegal” Christian churches. In the process, they have influenced public discourse and become useful allies to various political actors.³⁶

We can largely explain the timing of Islamist mobilization by a shift in the political opportunity structure, in particular, a series of religious edicts (fatwas) from the Indonesian


Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI) and the adoption of various laws and decrees by the central and regional governments. From 2005 to 2007, MUI issued a fatwa against Ahmadiyah,³⁷ all “deviant” sects, as well as pluralism, liberalism, and secularism. During the same period, the Indonesian government adopted various decrees and laws that imposed restrictions on religious minorities. It allowed local populations and governments to vet the construction of new places of worship, ordered Ahmadi Muslims to stop spreading their teaching, and adopted a new law on “religious harmony,” which imposed limits on proselytization.³⁸

As part of its democratic transition, Indonesia also implemented a vast program of political and administrative decentralization that turned regencies and cities into the most powerful government levels in Indonesia.³⁹ Since the mid-2000s, many politicians have built winning electoral coalitions by promising and adopting a host of new “Sharia bylaws” that regulate morality, Muslim clothing, almsgiving, and minority groups.⁴⁰ This normative and legal environment, combined with poor policing and political impunity,⁴¹ created a context conducive to Islamist mobilization.

While this explains the *timing* of Islamist mobilization at the national level, it fails to explain subnational variation. Similar political opportunities were available across Java, but only some regions witnessed the proliferation of Islamist groups and experienced persistent mobilization. The contrast is especially striking in Java, as seen in Figure 1. Among all the provinces, West Java is the one with the largest number of Islamist groups and the most frequent Islamist protests.⁴² The province is home to approximately 57 percent of all the groups in Java and 71 percent of all the protests since 2008. Meanwhile, Islamist groups experienced much more modest success in Central and East Java, despite local support for their agenda. These two

provinces combined are home to only about 31 percent of all the groups in Java and 25 percent of the mobilization.

Figure 1. Islamist Mobilization in Java, 2008–2014



Note: “Attributed” incidents were committed by a named Islamist group. “Total incidents” include both attributed and unattributed incidents, i.e., incidents committed by an unnamed or unknown group.

Source: Author’s data, from Wahid Institute, *Laporan Tahunan Kebebasan Beragama* (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009 to 2015).

At first glance, West Java does not significantly differ on the socio-economic variables conventionally used to predict Islamic radicalism. The province has a higher unemployment rate and a slightly lower GDP per capita than do other provinces, but scores higher on the Human Development Index and has much lower rates of rural poverty than other provinces in Java.⁴³ The fact that West Java is mostly similar to other Javanese provinces suggests that grievances are insufficient to explain the success of Islamist groups in that province.

A Structural Space for the Islamists

Provinces in Java vary in the way Islamic leadership and institutions are structured, and this is the key to understand Islamist success. In general, Muslim leaders in western Java are weaker, and the authority structure more fragmented and competitive. In eastern Java, however, religious elites are stronger, and the authority structures less fragmented and competitive. Islamists groups emerged mostly in West Java, where Muslim clerics are among the weakest—and elite structures the most competitive—in Indonesia.

The “demand” for Islamist mobilization is relatively constant across regions, both among the general population and established clerics. East and West Java have the same percentage of Muslim population (97 percent), with more than 75 percent of traditionalist Muslims.⁴⁴ People in West Java are, according to numerous surveys, slightly more intolerant of Christians than are people in Central and East Java. These provinces are, however, more similar than different when compared to other provinces in Indonesia.⁴⁵ Muslim leaders in West Java too tend to be slightly more intolerant of Christians than their counterparts in the rest of the island.⁴⁶ Yet Muslim leaders in both provinces have mobilized in very similar ways in favor of the adoption of Sharia bylaws by local governments. East and West Java are the two provinces with the largest number of such regulations in Indonesia.⁴⁷

The province of West Java has, of course, a unique history when it comes to radical Islam. In the 1950s and 1960s, the province was the theatre of the “Darul Islam” (*Abode of Islam*, DI) rebellion that tried to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.⁴⁸ Some argue that contemporary Islamist movements are linked to the remnants of that rebellion. Michael Buehler, for example, suggests that the democratic transition of 1998 reinvigorated these networks, as

former DI leaders became new powerbrokers for political parties with weak institutionalization.⁴⁹ The presence of DI networks in West Java, and their absence elsewhere in Java, might therefore explain why contemporary Islamist mobilization clusters in that province.

While plausible, the ties between militant Islamist groups and the old DI networks are generally overstated. Importantly, Islamist groups have experienced success in parts of Central and East Java where the rebellion did not take place. As I show below, they have experienced success only in regions of Central and East Java that are similar to West Java, that is, regions with weak religious institutions and competitive religious markets. My extensive work in Java also found that the leaders of Islamist groups, especially those active at the lower rungs of the organizations, have little if any relationship with DI networks. Instead, as I show below, what clerics in Islamist-prone areas have in common are their institutional and structural weaknesses. This pattern in West Java, I argue, was already well established at the onset of the rebellion in the 1940s. A full treatment of DI is beyond the scope of this article, but the data suggests that the rebellion may itself have been the result of the religious markets, rather than a separate, independent cause of contemporary movements.

While demand is far from irrelevant, I argue that Islamic institutions and markets are the key sources of variation. The influence of a cleric is tightly connected to the size of his Islamic school: the larger it is, the more authority he commands both in and outside his community.⁵⁰ Clerics with smaller schools are generally more marginal, their influence confined to the local level, and their survival as religious entrepreneurs is usually precarious. Clerics with larger schools enjoy influence beyond their community, take an active part in large networks of clerics, and are often courted by other clerics and political actors. Islamist groups have thrived where Muslim leaders are weak. From 2002 to 2014, the average school had only 136 students in West

Java, while it had 224 in East Java. Before the growth of Islamist groups in these regions around 2008, the differences were even sharper (153 students per school in West Java against 283 in East Java). The average cleric in West Java is thus much weaker institutionally than his Javanese counterpart.

Schools are not only smaller on average, but the province of West Java also has fewer dominant schools. Indeed, the religious market is more leveled where Islamists have had more success. West Java has only 25 schools with more than 1,000 students, of which only seven have more than 2,000 students. These large schools accounted for only 5.3 percent of the total student market. In East Java, by contrast, powerful and influential clerics control much larger shares of the pool of students. The province has fewer pesantren than West Java, but no less than 93 schools with more than 1,000 students, of which 37 have more than 2,000 students. These schools had approximately 22.7 percent of the total student population. This is a clear indication that East Java has a handful of influential clerics who dominate much of the religious markets, while West Java has a shortage of large schools and few influential clerics. Below, Figure 2 plots these large schools in each of the districts in Java. It clearly shows the concentration of influential clerics in the eastern part of the Island and their relative scarcity in its western part.

Islamic schools are the crucial building blocks of Islamic networks in both Indonesia and beyond.⁵¹ In Central and East Java, Islamic networks are stronger and more cohesive because its large schools have become central nodes in the network structure. Networks radiate from large schools (most influential clerics) to smaller schools, and from smaller schools to even smaller ones (least influential clerics). As discussed by Zamakhsyari Dhofier, these networks are based on intellectual traditions and kinship ties among families of clerics and help mitigate inter-cleric competition.⁵² Moreover, the clerics that occupy a central position in these networks are crucial

brokers: they have influence beyond their region, they bridge various networks, and have ties to closer and distant nodes in their network. Indonesian politicians and communities often refer to these clerics as *kyai* “*khos*,” or “special” clerics.

It is precisely those influential clerics who are missing in West Java. The province has more clerics than Central and East Java, but “only a handful of [them] have become influential at the national, let alone provincial levels.”⁵³ Most clerics thus have low-level influence and are somewhat marginal beyond their community.⁵⁴ The lack of influential clerics has made inter-elite networks weaker, and the elite structure more fragmented and competitive. Kinship and intellectual networks are much more porous and have failed to generate a strong sense of collective identity among its members.⁵⁵ Clerics in the region often describe their networks as thinner, more transactional, and informal than those in Central and East Java.⁵⁶

Islamic associations are much more hollow in West Java as a result. Although 72 percent of the Islamic schools claim to be part of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), only about 15 percent of them take an active part in the organization.⁵⁷ Organizational identity is generally weak among NU members.⁵⁸ Other clerics are either independent of any organizations or are members of organizations that have influence in only a few regencies. Islamic mass organizations, including the NU, lack institutionalization in West Java: they do not have offices below the regency level, and their sister associations for women, youth, and students are much less active on the ground. The contrast is sharp with East Java, where the NU is strong and hegemonic.⁵⁹ In this province, 82 percent of the Islamic schools claim to belong to the NU, and approximately 42 percent are active members of the organization, and even more people participate in its various sister associations. Network and associational identities are much stronger as a result.⁶⁰

The elite structure of East Java imposes barriers to entry and growth of new Islamist groups. The region's influential and cartelized clerics make Islamic authority much less prone to appropriation by newcomers: clerics who "are not part of a transmission chain are not easily accepted [by the community and by other clerics]."⁶¹ Islamist groups in East Java, therefore, have had to devote greater energy to convince local leaders of their credentials and that they belong to the same networks as them. To grow in East Java, as one leader of the influential Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) recognized, "we had to use the cultural approach, focusing on the pesantren, the ulama, and Nahdlatul Ulama's culture first."⁶² The leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq Shihab, conducted preaching tours in East Java from the mid-2000s to convince the ulama that FPI was, in his words, "a child of the NU family,"⁶³ and its members "the foot soldier of NU's struggle,"⁶⁴ the "protectors of NU against liberals and other enemies."⁶⁵ It was quite clear that the FPI could not succeed in Central or East Java without the support of the established clerics (*kyai*).⁶⁶ Despite all this work, FPI has remained mostly unsuccessful in East Java: it opened branches in only half of the regencies and almost none at the sub-regency level. FPI recruited most of its leaders from the Hadrami people, i.e., Indonesians of Arab origins who are not part of the same networks as most mainstream clerics and seldom participate in native Islamic organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.⁶⁷

West Java's elite structure, by contrast, has made the boundaries of Islamic authority much more fluid, thus inherently more prone to appropriation. Muslim leaders and networks are too weak to force Islamist groups to demonstrate their credentials. Islamist groups entered the province as early as 1998 and faced little resistance from existing clerics. In some regencies, multiple Islamist groups now coexist and pursue a similar agenda, but with a distinct leadership

structure. FPI, the largest of these groups, has branches in all the regencies of the province and in most of the sub-regencies of the Bandung area.

Structural Incentives for Radicalization and Moderation


In addition to granting space for Islamists, the market structure of a region shapes how established clerics respond to Islamist mobilization. In West Java, weak clerics and strong competition made Islamist mobilization far easier as it created a context inhospitable to “moderation” for two main reasons: first, it increased incentives for low-status clerics to join, form or make alliances with an Islamist group to bolster their limited religious influence; and, second, it increased the cost of mobilization against Islamists, thus forcing moderates and anti-Islamist leaders into silence.

Islamist groups have thrived where religious markets are more crowded and competitive. The southern part of West Java, where more Islamist groups have spread, had nearly three times as many pesantren as East Java (2.9 and 1.2 pesantren/10,000 inhabitants respectively) before the rise of Islamist groups. To gauge competition, I computed a “concentration ratio” in each of Java’s regencies. A concentration ratio measures the share of an industry’s output produced by a given number of firms in an industry. The most common way of measuring that ratio is to take the four largest firms in an industry and calculate the market share they control. The closer a concentration ratio is to zero, the more competitive the market; and, conversely, the closer it is to 100 percent, the more oligopolistic. I computed the concentration ratio of each of Java’s regency by calculating the percentage of the total number of students attending the four largest schools of a district.

The religious markets in West Java were the most competitive when Islamist groups spread outside Jakarta around 2008. As visible in Figure 2, the average concentration ratio was 18.8 percent in the province, which means that the four biggest schools in each regency had only about a fifth of all the students on average. In the southern part of West Java, where Islamists have been the most successful, concentration ratios drop to about 10.4 percent, the lowest in all of Java. Regencies like Cianjur, Sumedang, Cirebon and Tasikmalaya, where Islamist groups have been the most active and successful, have concentration ratios below 7.5. As hinted at before, these differences largely predate the Darul Islam rebellion of 1949–1962.⁶⁸ When the rebellion broke out, West Java had already ten times more pesantren per capita than Central and East Java, and those pesantren were, on average, twice as small.⁶⁹ If anything, the rebellion actually weakened the region's religious authority structure. During the war, many clerics were displaced, and their Islamic schools abandoned or destroyed⁷⁰, which led to an “acute shortage of influential ulama” after the war and until today.⁷¹

By contrast, religious markets were less competitive in Central and East Java, where Islamists have encountered little success. The concentration ratio in these two provinces is 30.5 percent. Now, throughout Java, and regardless of the province, regencies without a single instance of Islamist mobilization have both stronger religious elites (169.9 students/pesantren) and less competitive religious authority structures (concentration ratio=29 percent). By contrast, those regencies that have experienced the highest levels of Islamist mobilization both have the weakest elites (134.8 students/pesantren) and the most competitive religious authority structures (concentration ratio=16 percent) (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Competitive Religious Markets in Java



Islamist protests / million inhabitants	Concentration ratio	Student / Islamic school
None	29.0	169.9
0.1 to 5	19.3	149.3
More than 5	16.0	134.8

Note: The map highlights only regencies in the bottom quartile for students/school and concentration ratio. In the table, Islamist protests include both attributed and unattributed incidents.

Source: Author’s data; original data from Kementerian Agama, *Direktori Pondok Pesantren: Jumlah Santri dan Nama Kyai Tahun 2008–2009* (Kemenag: Jakarta, 2009).

Islamist Success in West Java

Religious competition in West Java has created incentives for the radicalization of mainstream Muslim leaders. Islamist groups proliferated because “petty ulama” found Islamist mobilization to be a convenient way to reinforce their religious capital when faced with intense competition.⁷² “Petty ulama”—clerics with low-status, few followers, and limited resources—are legion in West Java. The FPI’s most fertile source of leadership has come from those low-level clerics: 69% of FPI leaders at the regency level claimed the title of *ustadz* or *kyai*, the honorary title for ulama. Few of them have had ties to Darul Islam; most are marginal preachers who head one of the numerous small Islamic schools of the region.⁷³ These petty ulama were keen on using morality and sectarianism as Islamic ideologies of mobilization to stake out their own claim to authority and power.⁷⁴

The authority structure of West Java did not create radical ideas, but created a context in which mobilizing these ideas was useful. Petty ulama have used Islamist mobilization for what they could not achieve on their own, i.e., “build networks with other [ulama] and with more influential figures,” increase their popularity, and “expand their opportunities to preach [in mosques], as they draw revenues from such activities.”⁷⁵ For example, the chairman of FPI-central, Habib Rizieq, was an unknown *pesantren* leader—a petty ulama—before founding his organization. Before going into exile, he rose to prominence by holding a weekly sermon in his neighborhood mosque, which attracted thousands of people, and conducting dozens of sermons across Jakarta each month and in other provinces.⁷⁶

The same happened across the organization. For instance, the FPI chairman in Tasikmalaya leads a small Islamic school and used to occupy a very marginal position in the religious economy. After becoming chairman, however, he started giving weekly sermons in Tasikmalaya and monthly sermons in each of the regency’s districts. Such “professional advancement” would have been hardly conceivable in East Java. He, like other new Islamist leaders, made full use of the structural holes of the region’s authority structure to take on a new role of broker. Within a few months of leading FPI, he had garnered many more followers and become a well-known Islamic leader in the region, with easy access to policy-makers and public authorities.⁷⁷ In general, activist clerics have been better able to leverage their popularity to gain positions in Islamic public institutions, such as the lower rungs of MUI.⁷⁸ Politicians have also courted them to serve as vote brokers and thus join more extensive patron-client networks.⁷⁹

In Central and East Java, only the most respected clerics find positions in Islamic public institutions (i.e., MUI and the Ministry of Religious Affairs) or get opportunities to preach or become electoral brokers. In West Java, because the authority structure is more leveled, these

institutions and opportunities have become more porous to outsiders and more open to marginal yet entrepreneurial clerics. In the post-transition period, ulama councils and public mosques of this province have become far more heterogeneous than elsewhere on the island.⁸⁰ The stakes of occupying a position in a public Islamic institution are high for religious entrepreneurs everywhere but much higher for outsiders and marginal clerics. Those who gain a position in these institutions get “their expertise publicly affirmed, and a role in the allocation of resources and public consultation.”⁸¹ Unsurprisingly, the West Javanese authority structure has triggered greater rivalry and competition in these institutions. Islamic entrepreneurs have not hesitated to use extra-institutional mobilization, fame, and media exposure to gain access to them.

The authority structure has also created multiple incentives for alliances between mainstream clerics and Islamist groups. Weak clerics have found it useful to work with Islamist groups to increase their leverage vis-à-vis policy-makers. The relative weakness of clerics in West Java explains why Islamist groups proliferated and were more active than those in other provinces. In the districts where religious intolerance was more severe and persistent, such as Bogor, Kuningan, and Tasikmalaya, MUI built close working relations with FPI and other local radical groups by giving them office space or lower-ranking positions in the organization.⁸² FPI and MUI had complementary goals: “since the government would not enforce MUI’s fatwas directly, [MUI clerics] relied on the FPI to combat deviance in the streets, and thereby pressure the police and the government to back MUI in order to stop the violence.”⁸³ Where the connection was strong, radical groups forced the government, the police, and the media to treat MUI as a part of the state, although it was not.⁸⁴ In Tasikmalaya, MUI was able to garner more extensive funding from the local regency government, thus indicating the leverage power of those small radical groups.⁸⁵

This collaboration was also visible in the numerous “forums” that Muslim entrepreneurs have established in West Java, which bring together both mainstream clerics and radical groups. These forums, such as the Institute for the Assessment and Propagation of Islam in Cianjur or the Coordinating Body for the Unity of the Umma in Garut, have lobbied governments or pushed for sharia-inspired policies. They have also created vehicles for the support of political candidates and for the candidates to distribute patronage.⁸⁶ Although such forums exist everywhere in Java, they are far more common in West Java, precisely because no Islamic organization is strong enough on its own. For the average low-level cleric in West Java, these forums represent a quick way to get access to otherwise unavailable influence and resources. The success of these forums is the outcome of the alliance between respectable clerics and noisy Islamist groups. Each reinforces the position of the other, thus creating incentives for escalation and mobilization.

The drivers of radical mobilization in West Java were also those that prompted the demobilization of moderate anti-Islamist leaders. West Java does not lack anti-Islamist clerics, but these clerics lack a structural position strong enough to oppose Islamist groups. It is thus difficult for moderate clerics to oppose FPI publicly: “the risk of being isolated and singled out is enough for many *kyai*, who would otherwise oppose the FPI, to remain silent.”⁸⁷ Because they have fewer loyal followers to fall back on, petty ulama are much less willing to spend their limited religious capital on risky anti-Islamist mobilization as their networks are too weak to mitigate the risk or cushion the cost of anti-Islamist mobilization. Nahdlatul Ulama, known as a moderate organization in Java, has been much more reluctant to oppose Islamist groups in West Java than in other provinces. NU’s membership is much more diverse in West Java, and anti-Islamist clerics are too weak to steer the organization toward opposing FPI. Youth Islamic organizations as well, such as Ansor-Banser, remain neutral in West Java, even though they

oppose FPI elsewhere. Pluralist civil society organizations, too, walk a tightrope in the West Javanese religious market. Often called out in public as liberals, they feel that “[they] could not oppose the FPI head-on, [and] needed to be wiser about it.”⁸⁸ These lay organizations, in West as in East Java, will often seek the support of clerics as a form of guarantee against marginalization. In West Java, however, while some clerics support their activities, they prefer to remain under the radar by fear of harming their reputation. Although West Java has its share of moderates, they are demobilized and kept into silence by the authority structure of the region.

Islamist Failure in East Java

There is no lack of support for an Islamist agenda in East Java, but that support has not generated widespread Islamist success. Since the democratic transition, many clerics have actively opposed immorality and sought to curtail the rights of religious minorities in East Java, giving radical groups both religious and legal legitimation (through fatwas, regulations, and laws).⁸⁹ The authority structure in the province created a much different environment, however. Islamist groups generated little interest among clerics because they have much larger schools and, both high and low-level clerics belong to stronger and more institutionalized networks. This has given clerics more stable access to followers, thus lowered the need for extra-institutional mobilization to gain public recognition. As a result, not a single FPI leader in East Java (except for on the island of Madura) is a *kyai*, and FPI has not experienced much success among *pesantren* leaders.

Stronger networks and associations also tend to discourage Islamist “entrepreneurship” because they connect both higher and lower-level clerics, creating less exclusion. Petty ulama have more opportunities and resources to establish their authority than in West Java. Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, has a branch in every regency and most districts of the province. Higher-

level clerics find a space in higher echelons of the organization, while lower-level clerics also find a room, but in more local echelons of the organization. NU also has a host of well-established sister organizations, such as *Fatayat* for women, Ansor-Banser for youth, and IPNU-PMII for students. These organizations are “the playground of [aspiring clerics] and an amazing outlet through which they gain leadership skills and capacities.”⁹⁰ This dense associational structure discourages autonomous strategies: those who aspire to a position in an ulama council or the Ministry of Religious Affairs understand that they must first gain a position in Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, or one of their sister associations. These vehicles of social promotion tend to screen off free riders and help generate religious capital, which can then be leveraged into access and influence. It is precisely this function that West Javanese networks and associations failed to play and which prompted so many petty ulama to condone or join Islamist mobilization. In Malang (East Java), for example, Julian Millie and Linda Hindasah found that Islamist groups “have no representation in [the local ulama council], although they are active in the city.”⁹¹ Islamist groups are also more often “absent from the schedule of public mosques” as well, and are sometimes “refused access to public mosques” altogether.⁹² If Islamists have failed in East Java, it is because Islamic institutions discourage entrepreneurship, not because of ideological moderation.

The hegemony of mainstream clerics in the region is not just the outcome of NU’s numerical dominance, but also of “the purposeful exclusion of other groups.”⁹³ If clerics seek to exclude Islamist groups, it is often by fear of being outflanked rather than because of their moderation or opposition to conservative Islam. In East Java, moreover, clerics can use their strong networks for collective action, which is nearly impossible in West Java. In some regencies, such as Tuban, influential clerics worked with the local authorities to keep Islamist

groups at bay.⁹⁴ In other regions, such as Jombang, the ulama opposed FPI from the outset. After meeting with FPI, influential clerics in the region allowed the group to operate only if it focused on preaching and avoided violent demonstrations.⁹⁵ In many towns, FPI leaders had to consult with influential clerics to secure their permission before holding public events.⁹⁶ NU-affiliated groups have forced the disbandment of Salafi and Wahabi religious activities as well. Clerics have also protected their mosques against outsiders by strengthening their hold on the mosques' administrative structure and by ordering their supporters to bar entry to unknown people.⁹⁷ In June 2008, after FPI attacked and injured members of the National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion in Jakarta, East Javanese clerics and youth organizations organized anti-FPI protests, leading to the disbandment of numerous branches of the organization in the province. In West Java, protests were much more timid and were unable to shut down any FPI branches.

East Java is not without Islamist mobilization, however. FPI was successful at establishing several branches, but only in the regencies with the most competitive authority structure.⁹⁸ In Madura, for example, FPI and other Islamist groups are more active, and FPI was able to recruit its leader among the kyai, just like in West Java. This, however, is consistent with my argument: the authority structure in Madura is similar to that of West Java. Although schools are larger, the authority structure is more leveled and competitive than the rest of East Java (14 percent in Madura, 27.3 in East Java). The epicenter of anti-Shia mobilization is the regency of Sampang, Madura, where religious authority is among the most competitive of all of Java (9.1 percent concentration ratio, 3.1 pesantren per 10,000 Capita). Although most Madurese religious leaders have a strong NU identity, they are not as integrated within its networks as their counterparts in mainland East Java. Few Madurese clerics sit on the provincial Board of Nahdlatul Ulama and even fewer on its national board.⁹⁹ In the Madurese regency of Bangkalan,

for example, the cleric who became the chairman of the FPI “could not compete with middle- and high-status kyai of NU, so when FPI came and offered a leadership position to that kyai, he stepped in.”¹⁰⁰ He later leveraged his position in FPI to gain a formal position within NU, and then abandoned the leadership of the FPI altogether.¹⁰¹

In East Java, Islamist mobilization against Shia Muslims has only taken place where NU clerics are the weakest and where religious markets are the most competitive. The regencies of Jember, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Malang, Bondowoso, and Surabaya all have significant Shia communities, but not all of them have active anti-Shia groups.¹⁰² In Bangil (Pasuruan), as in Sampang and Jember, “the roots of violence lay in competition between traditional NU clerics and the Shi’ite school head.”¹⁰³ For some observers, “the anti-Shia’s activity in East Java involved NU *kyai* who felt directly threatened by what they saw as Shia’s encroachment on their traditional spheres of influence.”¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

This article used the case of Java to explore the role of religious authority structures in explaining Islamist mobilization. It argued that Islamist groups succeed where established clerics and Islamic networks are weak and fragmented and where the religious market is competitive. Crowded markets, especially when highly competitive, are conducive to Islamist success because they leave more space for new religious entrepreneurs, incentivize low-status clerics to support and join Islamist groups, and increase the cost of anti-Islamist mobilization. By contrast, Islamist groups are less successful where clerics and networks are strong and where religious markets are

less competitive. These environments tend to discourage entrepreneurship and leave little space for Islamist groups, and also facilitate anti-Islamist mobilization. The crucial factor explaining Islamist success in Java is not so much the presence or absence of radicals or moderates, but the structure and institutions that silence or mobilize them.

My analysis of Islamist mobilization in Java has implications for understanding Islamism in other contexts as well. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, owes in part to the support and participation they received from the Mullahs, that is, the local ulama. Before the Taliban, Mullahs were marginal actors; they had only “a secondary (if not tertiary) role to play in society” and “had neither independent financial resources nor much of a political voice.”¹⁰⁵ The Mullahs saw in an alliance with the Taliban a way to gain ascendancy: the Mullahs “eagerly embraced this increased status, using the mosque (masjid) and madrasah to consolidate themselves as the leaders of the Pashtuns.”¹⁰⁶ In Pakistan, Mumtaz Ahmad has suggested that the success of militant sectarianism was the outcome of a “revolt of the petty ulama” in the 1980s.¹⁰⁷ The mushrooming of madrasahs and Islamic seminaries (*darul-ulum*) in the 1970s and 1980s profoundly reconfigured Pakistan’s religious market.¹⁰⁸ In Punjab alone, the number of madrasahs went from a little over 700 in 1975 to somewhere between 14,000 and 16,000 today.¹⁰⁹ While only a minority of madrasahs pursue radical agendas, this proliferation nevertheless heightened competition and multiplied the number of low-level ulama with poor prospects of employment, but who could use sectarian rhetoric and violent mobilization to gain a space in the religious market. In Egypt, Malika Zeghal reached a similar conclusion: radicalism among ulama came from the “peripheral ulama,” those educated in al-Azhar, specialized in preaching, but without important positions as civil servants and facing daily competition on the ground from the Muslim Brotherhood. She argues that “the increasing fragmentation of the corps

of the ulama, as well as their increasing power, are closely linked with the emergence of conflict and violence in the political arena.”¹¹⁰ Richard Nielsen, too, has shown in his recent book that ulama most likely to adopt jihadi ideologies are those with inadequate network resources and those excluded from formal state employment.¹¹¹ These examples hint to similar dynamics, yet more research is needed about the leaders of contemporary Islamist movements, beyond the top-level leaders. We know little about the mid-level and lower-level clerics who support or resist jihadi incursions in their localities. My approach provides a framework through which to examine these questions.

This article joins other work that has proposed a micropolitical shift in the study of Islamism, which has produced positive theoretical contributions in the study of ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Mobilization and resistance do not happen uniformly across time and space. We need to pay more attention to micro-level social interactions, studied through political ethnographic work and careful within-case comparison.

Finally, this study also provides a new perspective on the so-called “inclusion-moderation” thesis. Many have complained about Muslim moderates’ silence in front of Jihadi violence and terrorism. The case of Java illustrates well why “moderate Islam is not working,” or at least, why moderation is such a difficult position to hold for many clerics.¹¹² Preventing radical mobilization requires much more religious capital than most clerics are ready or able to spend. The lack of anti-Islamist mobilization is more often an outcome of the weakness of Muslim clerics, rather than of a lack of “moderate” commitment among some of them. Interestingly as well, the case of East Java shows that “tolerance” does not need to be substantial. What appears like tolerance from the outside would perhaps be more accurately described as the “silence” or the “restraint” of the radicals. One of the main takeaway points from this article, and

perhaps its most sobering aspect, is that tolerance does not require tolerant people, but the right set of institutions to silence the radicals.

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⁶² Interview with Habib Mushin Alatas, Member of the Dewan Pembina FPI (National), Bogor, West Java, February 2014.

⁶³ Quoted in Ferdinand Waskita, “Habib Rizieq: NU adalah Rumahnya FPI” [Habib Rizieq: FPI is NU’s Home] *TribunNews*, 27 February 2011.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Habib Rizieq, Public Speech, Malang, Malang, East Java, [2010?], Available online: *Habib Rizieq: NU Adalah Milik Kita Bersama* [Habib Rizieq: NU is Ours] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJoZ2bbBPnU&list=PLIRV5rGNH1Gz3kScDBg7-81AL158DWpOj>

⁶⁶ Interview with a rank-and-file member of FPI, Surakarta, February 2014.

⁶⁷ Martin Slama, “Paths of Institutionalization, Varying Divisions, and Contested Radicalisms: Comparing Hadhrami Communities on Java and Sulawesi,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 31 (August 2011), 337.

⁶⁸ For a historical explanation of these institutional differences, see Alexandre Paquin-Pelletier, *Radical Leaders: Status, Competition, and Violent Islamic Mobilization in Indonesia*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2019).

⁶⁹ Dhofier, 20.

⁷⁰ It is something visible in the pesantren surveys of the 1950s. See Indonesia, *Daftar Perangkaan Madrasah/Pondok Pesantren/Pengadjian Diseluruh Indonesia* [List of Statistics of Madrasah/Pesantren/Preaching Throughout Indonesia] (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama, 1956).

⁷¹ Hiroko Hirikoshi, "Islamic Scholasticism, Social Conflicts and Political Power: Corporate and Non-Corporate Features of Muslim Learned Men in West Java," *Social Compass*, 31 (February 1984), 87.

⁷² The term "petty ulama" is from Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies*, 34 (January 2000), 150.

⁷³ Interview with a former member of FPI and assistant to the former chairman of FPI-Cicalangka, Bandung, April 2014.

⁷⁴ Nasr, 151.

⁷⁵ Interview with Ajengan Fauz Noor, Pesantren teacher and university lecturer, Bandung, May 2014.

⁷⁶ Interview with Habib Mushin Alatas.

⁷⁷ Ibid. Interview with Asef Syaffulah, Chairman of FPI-DPC Tarogong Kidul, Garut, May 2014; Interview with Momon, Panglima-FPI, Garut, May 2014.

⁷⁸ Kikue Hamayotsu, "Making the Majority in the Name of Islam: Democratization, Moderate-Radical Coalition and Religious Intolerance in Indonesia" Paper presented at The State of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia Conference, Cornell University, April 13, 2019, 20

⁷⁹ Buehler.

⁸⁰ Julian Millie, Greg Barton, Linda Hindasah and Mikihiro Moriyama, “Post-Authoritarian Diversity in Indonesia’s State-Owned Mosques: A Manakiban Case Study,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 45 (June 2014), 194–213.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Hamayotsu, 20.

⁸³ Jeremy Menchik, “Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of the Fatwa”, Paper prepared for the Annual Association for Asian Studies Conference, Washington, DC (2018), 25.

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Julian Millie and Linda Hindasah. “Regional Aspects of the Indonesian Ulama Council’s Ideological Turn,” *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, 16 (May 2015), 269-70.

⁸⁶ Buehler, 63–82.

⁸⁷ Interview with Wawan Gunawan, former chairman of PMII-Bandung, June 2014; Interview with KH Imam Ghozali Said, Religious Harmony Forum-Surabaya, Surabaya, 20 May 2016.

⁸⁸ Interview with KH Imam Ghozali Said.

⁸⁹ See, for example, “Sejumlah Ulama Sepuh Minta Ahmadiyah Dibubarkan” [Several Respected Scholars Demand the Disbandment of Ahmadiyah], *NU Online*, 17 August 2005; Ahmad Sadzali, “Kiai Subadar: NU Harus Bersih dari Jaringan Islam Liberal” [NU Must be Cleaned from the Liberal Islamic Network], *Hidayatullah*, 26 November 2004.

⁹⁰ Interview with Gus Rizal, Chairman of RMI Surabaya, Surabaya, May 2016.

⁹¹ Millie and Hindasah, 273.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Interview with a local researcher, Yogyakarta, June 2014.

⁹⁵ Interview with Gus Roy Murtadho, Jombang, June 2014; Interview with Ustadz Aan Anshori, Coordinator of Islamic Network against Discrimination, Yogyakarta, June 2014.

⁹⁶ Interview with Gus Roy Murtadho.

⁹⁷ Interview with Kiagus Zaenal Mubarak, Vice-chairman of NU in West Java, May 2016.

⁹⁸ The ratio of the 13 regencies where we find FPI branches in East Java is 16.5 percent, half the concentration ratio of the province as a whole.

⁹⁹ Email correspondence with Ali Imron, NU Activist from Madura, November 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Professor Akh. Muzakki, Secretary of Nahdlatul Ulama-East Java, Surabaya, April 2014.

¹⁰² They include groups such as the al-Bayyinah Foundation, the Forum Against Deviant Sects, the Majelis Taklim Aswaja, and the Sunni Straight Path (*Aswaja Garis Lurus*).

¹⁰³ Interview with a peacemaker in Sampang, Surabaya, March 2014.

¹⁰⁴ IPAC, *The Anti-Shi'a Movement in Indonesia*, IPAC Report No. 27 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2016), 20. See also A. Z. Hamdi, "Klaim Religious Authority dalam Konflik Sunni-Syi'i Sampang Madura" [Religious Authority Claims in the Sunni-Shi'i Conflict of Sampang Madura], *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 6 (March 2012), 215–231.

¹⁰⁵ Hassan Abbas, *The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 46.

¹⁰⁶ Vern Liebl, "Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 18 (September 2007), 503.

¹⁰⁷ Mumtaz Ahmad, "Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism and Violence in Pakistan," in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy, eds., *Pakistan 1997* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998),

101, quoted in Nasr, 150.

¹⁰⁸ Nasr, 142.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952–94).” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 31 (August 1999), 371–399.

¹¹¹ Richard A. Nielsen, *Deadly Clerics: Blocked Ambition and the Paths to Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

¹¹² Cheryl Bernard, “‘Moderate Islam’ Isn’t Working” *The National Interest*, December 2015.